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TRUTH, LIES, AND COPYRIGHT 
Cathay Y. N. Smith 
Fake news may be trending right now, but fake news is not the only source 
of fake facts that we consume. We encounter fake facts every day in the historical 
or biographical books we read, the movies we watch, the maps we study, the tele-
phone directories and dictionaries we reference, and the religious or spiritual 
guides we consult. While it is well-established that copyright does not protect 
facts because facts are discovered rather than created, fake facts are created and 
can often be as original and creative as fiction. 
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of copyright protec-
tion of fake facts contained in fake news and other sources. It details the different 
categories of fake facts we encounter today and courts’ inconsistent protection of 
fake facts under copyright law. Even though copyright law may technically pro-
tect fake facts as original expression fixed in a tangible medium, this Article ar-
gues that the public interest in promoting efficiency, fairness, and production of 
socially valuable works justify treating fake facts as unprotectable facts under 
copyright law. Specifically, courts should apply copyright law’s factual estoppel 
doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts in infringement cases where an 
author previously held out fake facts as facts, with the intent that the public rely 
on the fake facts as facts, if the public could believe the fake facts to be true. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fake news. The Pizzagate conspiracy. Deep fakes. A Million Little Pieces. 
Three Cups of Tea. In the Garden of Good and Evil. Found-footage films. The 
Blair Witch Project. News satire. The Onion. The Borowitz Report. Paper 
towns. Trap streets. Ghost words. Every day, we are assailed with fake facts. 
Fake facts are fictions, created stories, or unverifiable illusions held out to the 
public as true. These fake facts can include fake news stories, deep fakes, fic-
tional embellishments in nonfiction works, fictitious entries in data and 
knowledge repositories, unverifiable divine revelations or spiritual claims, and 
outright lies. Some fake facts are held out as true in order to deceive or mislead 
us. Some are held out to entertain us. Some fake facts are held out in order to 
detect plagiarism. Other fake facts are held out as true in order to induce us to 
believe. In spite of the recent media attention on fake news, fake news is not 
the only source of fake facts circulated for public consumption. Fake facts have 
long infiltrated our culture in the historical or biographical books we read, the 
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movies we watch, the maps we study, the telephone directories and dictionaries 
we reference, and the religious or spiritual guides we consult. 
It is well-established that copyright law does not protect facts. Facts are 
discovered rather than authored and, therefore, are not subject to copyright pro-
tection.1 Fake facts, however, are created and not discovered, and are often as 
original and creative as fiction. Copyright law, technically, would protect these 
fictions.2 In the past, a handful of courts have considered the copyrightability of 
fake facts and have applied copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine to prevent 
authors from claiming their works to be fiction and, therefore, entitled to higher 
copyright protections after those authors previously held out the same works to 
the public as nonfiction.3 Under the factual estoppel doctrine, these courts 
treated the author’s fake facts as facts, granting them limited copyright protec-
tion.4 The first case in the United States to consider copyright of fake facts was 
in 1913 when a journalist sued a playwright for copying the plot of the journal-
ist’s fake news article.5 The court held that the plot of the fake news article was 
not protected by copyright because it was previously held out as true.6 Since 
then, courts have applied the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as un-
protectable facts in infringement cases involving fictional embellishments in 
historical or biographical works, fictitious entries in telephone directories, fake 
streets in maps or fake entries in encyclopedias, and claims of divine, extrater-
restrial, or scientific revelations in spiritual and religious texts.7 Within those 
limited decisions, however, courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply the 
doctrine to treat fake facts as facts, or have been inconsistent in their applica-
tion of the doctrine and uncertain when the doctrine should apply.8 
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of copyright protection 
of fake facts and discussion of copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine. It ad-
vocates for courts to consistently apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat 
fake facts as unprotectable facts where the author held out fake facts as facts, 
with the intent that the public rely on those fake facts as fact, and where the 
public could believe that the fake facts were true. Part I details the different 
categories of fake facts that pervade our society, including fake news and deep 
fakes, fictional embellishments in biographical or historical works, fictitious 
entries in factual compilations, and revelations in spiritual and religious works. 
It is surprisingly common to find fake or embellished “facts” in works that we 
 
1  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344–47 (1991) (“That there 
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of 
copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates’ ”) (quoting 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
2  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”). 
3  See infra Part III. 
4  See infra Part III. 
5  Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
6  Id. at 55. 
7  See infra Part III. 
8  See infra Part III. 
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typically rely on to be true. Part II explains why copyright law does not and 
should not protect facts. Part III outlines courts’ inconsistent treatment of fake 
facts under copyright law, including their failure or reluctance to treat fake 
facts as facts and their conflicting requirements for applying the factual estop-
pel doctrine in copyright infringement cases. Part IV sets forth the reasons why 
copyright should not protect fake facts and justifies the factual estoppel doc-
trine under the public’s interest in efficiency, fairness, and promotion of social-
ly valuable works. While there are concerns that treating fake facts as unpro-
tectable facts under copyright law could increase dissemination of fake facts 
and discourage production of certain genres of works, on balance, the justifica-
tions for applying the factual estoppel doctrine outweigh the concerns. Finally, 
Part V draws from other areas of the law, including false advertising, trademark 
infringement, and classic equitable estoppel defenses, to recommend a new fac-
tual estoppel doctrine framework for courts and litigants to determine when 
fake facts should be treated as unprotectable facts in copyright infringement 
cases. 
I. FAKE FACTS 
Recent media coverage has brought attention to the widespread problem of 
fake news.9 Fake news is “intentionally and verifiably false” news stories that 
“could mislead readers.”10 A recent study by Pew Research Center shows that 
at least 23 percent of Americans have accidentally or intentionally shared fake 
news,11 and Statista reports that 52 percent of respondents see fake news on so-
cial media websites at least once a day.12 The Pizzagate incident is just one in-
famous example of fake news that went viral.13 The Pizzagate incident began 
with fake news articles linking then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton to an 
alleged child-sex-trafficking ring operated from a pizzeria in Washington, 
D.C.14 After this fake news went viral on the Internet, a man, believing the fake 
 
9  See, e.g., David Graham, Some Real News About Fake News, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/fake-news-republicans-democrats/591 
211/ [https://perma.cc/JFY8-S9CV]; Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up 
News is a Critical Problem That Needs to be Fixed, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-pr 
oblem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ [https://perma.cc/XC8K-WTR6]. 
10  Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 
31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 213 (2017). 
11  Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-
news-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/3XJ7-EWHQ]. 
12  Amy Watson, Perceived Frequency of Online News Websites Reporting Fake News Sto-
ries in the United States as of March 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/649 
234/fake-news-exposure-usa/ [https://perma.cc/9TUW-FG8G] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
13  See, e.g., Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 16, 
2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/pizzagate-anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scan 
dal-w511904 [https://perma.cc/GB2A-38Z7]. 
14  Spencer S. Hsu, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Says He Was Foolish, Reckless, Mistaken – and 
Sorry, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ 
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news to be true, entered the pizzeria with a fully loaded AR 15 military-style 
rifle, “a .38 handgun[,] and a folding knife15 . . . . He shot open a lock and 
found cooking supplies. He whipped open another door and found [] fresh piz-
za dough. [He] did not find any captive children.”16 The Pizzagate story has 
since been debunked as fake news by multiple media sources, but there are still 
those who believe that it is true.17 The National Enquirer is another “news” 
source that publishes “outrageous and sometimes fake news stories.”18 Some 
even described it as being “the original fake news media outlet that profits by 
selling fake news.”19 For instance, in 2015, the National Enquirer published an 
article claiming that Hillary Clinton’s White House dreams were over because 
she only had six months to live.20 An even more recent and troubling problem 
involves deep fakes. Deep fakes are videos generated by deep-learning com-
puter applications “that look strikingly real.”21 These fakes are so realistic that 
an unaided observer would not be able to detect the fake.22 They operate 
through machine-learning algorithms and facial-mapping software to scan mul-
tiple photos of a person and their facial features, or record that person making 
different facial expressions, to generate “believable videos of people doing and 
saying things they never did.”23 Deep fakes have already been used in abusive 
ways to create fake sex videos featuring celebrities or other women.24 They 
have also been created to feature public officials “saying or doing things they 
have never said or done.”25 Authors of fake news or deep fakes have different 
 
pizzagate-shooter-apologizes-in-handwritten-letter-for-his-mistakes-ahead-of-sentencing 
/2017/06/13/f35126b6-5086-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html [https://perma.cc/TV5BZ 
K6N]. 
15  See id.; see also Robb, supra note 13. 
16  Robb, supra note 13. 
17  Scott Bauer, Pizzagate is Real, Says Paul Ryan’s Challenger, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
14, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/14/paul-ryan-opponent-says-he-believes-
pizzagate-conspiracy/ [https://perma.cc/9KAX-466Q]. 
18  National Enquirer, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/national-
enquirer/ [https://perma.cc/6AAC-ENZD] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019); see also Kathy Kiely, 
Tabloid Newspapers Raise Ethical Eyebrows, but Social Media is Greater Worry for De-
mocracy, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/12/19 
/national-enquirer-tabloid-fake-news-democracy-social-media-trump-column/2354021002/[h 
ttps://perma.cc/R48C-GMCR]. 
19  National Enquirer, supra note 18. 
20  Id. 
21  Hilke Schellmann, Deepfake Videos Are Getting Real and That’s a Problem, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deepfake-videos-are-ruining-lives-is-democ 
racy-next-1539595787 [https://perma.cc/JHU8-2GW3]. 
22  Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security, 
Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deep-fak 
es-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy [https://perma.cc/3MS7-NLJA]. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep Fakes Are Where Truth Goes 
to Die, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/ 
deep-fakes-fake-news-truth [https://perma.cc/7C5E-BKES]. 
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incentives for creating them: some earn income through Internet search engine 
advertising, others seek to influence national political debates or election re-
sults.26 In spite of the current increased attention on fake news and deep fakes, 
these deceptions are not the only source of fake facts circulated for public con-
sumption. In fact, fake news is not even a new phenomenon. For instance, in 
1835, the New York Sun published a series of fake news articles about the dis-
covery of life on the moon.27 In fact, the first published factual estoppel case in 
the United States, discussed later in this Article, was a 1913 decision denying 
copyright protection to the plot of a fake news article that detailed the (fake) 
dramatic criminal trial of a pregnant woman and her lover.28 
In addition to fake news and deep fakes, there are many other ways fake 
facts infiltrate our society. For instance, authors of historical or nonfiction 
works sometimes embellish their writings with fake facts in order to make their 
works more interesting and marketable to the public. A few recent high-profile 
cases involving this type of deception were James Frey’s bestselling book A 
Million Little Pieces and Greg Mortenson’s popular book Three Cups of Tea: 
One Man’s Mission to Fight Terrorism One School at a Time. Take Frey’s A 
Million Little Pieces as an example. A Million Little Pieces was originally mar-
keted as a memoir about the author’s painful recovery from substance abuse in 
a rehabilitation treatment center.29 After making Oprah’s Book Club selection 
in 2005, Frey’s book topped the New York Times Best Seller list for fifteen 
consecutive weeks.30 Two years after publication of the book, The Smoking 
Gun published A Million Little Lies, debunking many of the facts in Frey’s 
book.31 Those fake facts included the amount of time Frey claimed he spent in 
jail, the manner of his girlfriend’s death, details about an incident outside the 
rehabilitation center, and accounts of Frey receiving a root canal without anes-
thesia.32 Similarly, Mortenson’s Three Cups of Tea was also on the New York 
Times nonfiction bestseller list for three years and a popular reading assignment 
for college students.33 Three Cups of Tea detailed the story of Mortenson’s hu-
 
26  Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 10, at 217. 
27  Id. at 214; N.Y. ‘Sun’ Launches Six-Part Fake News Series, 1835, NEWSEUMED, https: 
//newseumed.org/artifact/new-york-sun-launches-six-part-fake-news-series-1835/ [https: 
//perma.cc/UB5L-F7CW] (last visited July 9, 2019). 
28  Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
29  See A Million Little Pieces, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Million-Little-Pieces-Ja 
mes-Frey/dp/0307276902 [https://perma.cc/Q8L3-HGJ6] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
30  Adam White, A Million Little Pieces: Without Mention of its Scandal, What is There Left 
to Say About James Frey’s Addiction Opus?, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www. 
independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/a-million-little-pieces-movie-jamesfrey- 
oprah-adaptation-memoir-a9085796.html [https://perma.cc/74JJ-Y777]. 
31  A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey’s Fiction Addiction, SMOKING GUN (Jan. 4, 
2006), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/celebrity/million-little-lies [https://perma. 
cc/SK2A-KV3V]. 
32  Edward Wyatt, Author is Kicked Out of Oprah Winfrey’s Book Club, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/27/books/27oprah.html [https://perma.cc/NF5R-8L 
2J]. 
33  Three Cups of Tea, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Cups_of_Tea [https: 
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manitarian efforts in reducing poverty and increasing educational opportunities 
for girls in Pakistan and Afghanistan.34 Mortenson followed the success of 
Three Cups of Tea with the book Stones Into Schools: Promoting Peace with 
Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan.35 In 2011, Sixty Minutes re-
ported on the fake facts in Mortenson’s books, claiming that “some of the most 
touching and harrowing tales in Mortenson’s books appear to have been either 
greatly exaggerated or made up out of whole cloth.”36 These fake facts included 
Mortenson’s claim to have stumbled into the village of Korphe on his descent 
from K2, where he promised to build the village a school, and his sensational 
claim that he was captured by the Taliban.37 The inclusion of fake facts in non-
fiction works is surprisingly common.38 Other noteworthy examples of this be-
havior are Louis Linton’s In Congo’s Shadow, a memoir about her volunteer 
time in Zambia, where she claims that she cared for an HIV-positive orphan 
and was forced to hide from murderous rebels.39 Her memoir has been heavily 
criticized for being largely fake.40 Author John Berendt likely missed out on a 
Pulitzer Prize for his blockbuster nonfiction book, Midnight in the Garden of 
 
//perma.cc/J2JX-CGQV] (last visited July 6, 2019). 
34  Bernadette Murphy, ‘Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’ by Greg Mortenson, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.la 
times.com/style/la-et-book30-2009nov30-story.html [https://perma.cc/SVZ8-BPQ4]. 
35  See Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Stones-into-Schools-Promoting-Afghanistan 
/dp/0670021156 [https://perma.cc/ZFC3-NRFP] (last visited July 8, 2019). 
36  60 MINUTES, Questions Over Greg Mortenson’s Stories, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2011), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/questions-over-greg-mortensons-stories-19-04-2011/2/ 
[https://perma.cc/62UW-YPVY]. 
37  See id.; Ron Moreau & Sami Yousafzai, Mansur Khan Mahsud: Greg Mortenson is a Li-
ar, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.thedailybeast.com/mansur-khan-mahsud-greg 
-mortenson-is-a-liar [https://perma.cc/C9VY-ZSHF] (last updated July 13, 2017). 
38  This Article is concerned with fake facts and not what other commentators have described 
as fictional facts. “Fictional facts are the narrative building blocks with which an author con-
structs a work of fiction.” Matt Kellogg, The Problem of Fictional Facts: Idea, Expression, 
and Copyright’s Balance Between Author Incentive and Public Interest, 58 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 549, 550 (2011). Specifically, fictional facts are fictions created in works held 
out by authors as being fiction. The Harry Potter Lexicon is an example that illustrates the 
difference between fictional facts and fake facts. Id. at 549–50. The Harry Potter Lexicon 
was created by Steven Vander Ark, a Harry Potter fan, and included a detailed “index of eve-
ry incident, character, spell, and object that appeared in the [Harry Potter] series.” Id. These 
fictional details, which served as the narrative building blocks of the Harry Potter stories, are 
“fictional facts.” Id. at 550. Fake facts, on the other hand, are fictions that are held out as be-
ing factual. Had the Harry Potter series been marketed and advertised as nonfiction, and the 
public could believe it to be nonfiction, the details in the stories would be considered fake 
facts. See id. at 551. For a detailed analysis of fictional facts, see Kellogg, supra. 
39  Craig Silverman, People Are Calling Bullshit on This Woman’s Memoir About Her “Gap 
Year in Africa,” BUZZFEED (July 4, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/people 
-are-calling-bullshit-on-this-memoir [https://perma.cc/UQZ7-D27T]. 
40  Id. 
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Good and Evil, when it was discovered that Berendt took too many liberties 
with facts in his story.41 
Another way we are exposed to fake facts is through authors who purpose-
fully include fake facts in their works to catch others who copy their works. In 
certain data-publishing industries, such as telephone directories, dictionaries, 
charts and ratings, or mapmaking, it is common for authors to plant fake facts 
in their works in order to detect plagiarism. For instance, publishers of tele-
phone directories will often include a handful of fake names and numbers in 
their directories so that they can detect when a competitor copies their entries.42 
If another telephone directory also includes those fake entries, the original pub-
lisher assumes that the latter publisher copied the first without doing any inde-
pendent research. Indeed, it was four such fake entries that led Rural Telephone 
Company to accuse Feist Publications of copying its telephone directory, lead-
ing to the famous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Co., Inc.43 Dictionaries or encyclopedias will also sometimes 
include made-up entries to detect and demonstrate plagiarism. For instance, 
“[i]n 1977, Fred L. Worth wrote The Complete Unabridged Super Trivia Ency-
clopedia” which included the fake fact that the 1970s TV detective Columbo’s 
first name was Philip.44 When the board game Trivial Pursuit included that 
same fake fact in its popular game, Worth sued for copyright infringement.45 
Similarly, The New Columbia Encyclopedia of 1975 included an entry for 
“Mountweazel” with the biography for Lillian Virginia Mountweazel, a fake 
person born in Bangs, Ohio in 1942.46 Mountweazel, described as “a fountain 
designer turned photographer who was celebrated for a collection of photo-
graphs of rural American mailboxes titled ‘Flags Up![,]’ ” died “ ‘at 31 in an 
explosion while on assignment for Combustibles magazine.’ ”47 Similarly, the 
New Oxford American Dictionary included the made-up word “esquivalience” 
in 2001 to protect the copyright of its new electronic version of the dictionary.48 
It defined esquivalience as “the willful avoidance of one’s official responsibili-
 
41  Edward Wyatt, His Blockbuster on Shelves, He Tempts Fate with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
21, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/books/his-blockbuster-on-shelves-he-tem 
pts-fate-with-fire.html [https://perma.cc/L39X-PCP9]. 
42  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
43  Id. 
44  Blog: It’s a Fake!, PORTABLE PRESS (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.portablepress.com/bl 
og/2013/08/its-a-fake-facts/ [https://perma.cc/HYK6-JU73] (citing to FRED L. WORTH, THE 
COMPLETE UNABRIDGED SUPER TRIVIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1977)). 
45  Tamar Lewin, Issues Pursued in Copyright Lawsuit Are Not Trivial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/13/us/issues-pursued-in-copyright-lawsuit-are-not-
trivial.html [https://perma.cc/QT8M-5CRD]. 
46  Henry Alford, Not a Word, NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2005), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2005/08/29/not-a-word [https://perma.cc/U9TC-YLRM]; see also Bryan A. Gar-
ner, A Legal Lexicographer Looks at Law Reviews, 16 GREEN BAG 281, 284 (2013). 
47  Alford, supra note 46. 
48  Id. 
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ties.”49 It is also common for mapmakers to include one or two fake towns or 
streets, commonly known as paper towns or trap streets, in their maps in order 
to catch others who plagiarize their maps.50 These paper towns or trap streets 
do not exist in reality, but only on the mapmaker’s map. If another map were to 
include these trap streets or paper towns, the original mapmaker would know 
that its map had been copied. This strategy, however, has not always been suc-
cessful. Agloe, New York, for instance, was a paper town that General Drafting 
included in its roadmap of New York State in the 1930s.51 At that time, the di-
rector of General Drafting Otto G. Lindberg and his assistant Ernest Alpers 
created the name “Agloe” for their fake town by mixing the first letters in their 
names: OGL with EA.52 The town did not exist in reality but was included in 
their map of New York to detect plagiarism.53 A few years later, Rand McNally 
published a map of New York which included the town Agloe, New York.54 
General Drafting accused Rand McNally of copying its map; however, Rand 
McNally successfully defended itself by showing that the town actually exist-
ed.55 There was indeed an Agloe General Store located at the precise location 
of General Drafting’s “Agloe.”56 This was, however, not an incredible coinci-
dence; the owners of the general store chose the name after seeing the fake 
town on General Drafting’s map.57 
The final category of fake facts is those created to entertain, including 
works such as found footage films, news satire or fictional news tabloids, and 
historical fiction. Authors of these fake facts hold out their works as being true 
in order to entertain their readers or audiences. Sometimes it is obvious that 
these works are fake, but other times it is less clear, and the public may be 
duped into believing that the facts or events described in these works are true. 
For instance, The Blair Witch Project was a popular 1999 horror found-footage 
film about three film students who, while making a documentary about the su-
pernatural legend the Blair Witch, “disappear[ed] into the Black Hills with their 
 
49  Garner, supra note 46, at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Is Esquiv-
alience Now a Bona Fide Word?, ENG. LANGUAGE & USAGE, https://english.stackexchange. 
com/questions/87063/is-esquivalience-now-a-bona-fide-word [https://perma.cc/3PCR-JGH 
W] (last visited June 24, 2019). 
50  MARK MONMONIER, HOW TO LIE WITH MAPS 51 (2d ed. 1991). 
51  Robert Krulwich, An Imaginary Town Becomes Real, Then Not. True Story, NPR (Mar. 
18, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2014/03/18/290236647/an-imaginary-to 
wn-becomes-real-then-not-true-story [https://perma.cc/ET7W-ZZX7]; see also Laura Moss, 
‘Paper towns’ and Other Lies Maps Tell You, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.mnn.com/lifestyle/arts-culture/stories/paper-towns-and-other-lies-maps-tell-you 
[https://perma.cc/J23T-KS36]. 
52  Krulwich, supra note 51. 
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54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
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recording equipment.”58 The producers of the film marketed the movie as a true 
story, supporting their claim with fake police reports, newsreel-style interviews, 
photographs, diary entries on the movie’s website,59 false claims that the stu-
dents were “missing and assumed dead” on websites such as IMDb, and miss-
ing-persons posters for the three actors.60 Orson Wells’s War of the Worlds ra-
dio show from 1938 is an older example of the public being duped into 
believing entertaining fake facts. On October 30, 1938, Columbia Broadcasting 
System broadcasted Orson Wells and a group of actors reading a dramatic 
script, adapted from H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds, about aliens from Mars 
invading earth.61 Many listeners who had tuned into the radio broadcast be-
lieved that the invasion from Mars was real and shared the news with others, 
creating a nationwide panic.62 Families fled their homes to nearby parks and 
some rushed out of their houses with wet cloths over their faces to flee from 
what they thought was an alien gas raid.63 Thousands throughout the nation 
called the police and media seeking advice on how to protect themselves 
against the aliens.64 Sometimes, even works that most people know are satire, 
fake, or even absurd have caused confusion. For instance, the Weekly World 
News publishes outlandish stories featuring supernatural or paranormal themes 
that are largely fictional.65 These themes include discovering Bat Boy in a cave 
in West Virginia and reporting on his adventures and shenanigans; the ALIVE! 
series where dead celebrities are believed to have reemerged; and sightings of 
mummies, prehistoric monsters, Santa Clause, aliens, merfolk, and cryptids.66 
Similarly, the Onion publishes satirical news articles on international, national, 
 
58  Neil Davidson, The Blair Witch Project: The Best Viral Marketing Campaign of All Time, 
MWP (Aug. 5, 2013), http://mwpdigitalmedia.com/blog/the-blair-witch-project-the-best-v 
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59  Rebecca Hawkes, Why Did the World Think the Blair Witch Project Really Happened?, 
TELEGRAPH (July 25, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/2016/07/25/why-did-the- 
world-think-the-blair-witch-project-really-happened/ [https://perma.cc/KT4G-2G77]; Ber-
nard Weinraub, ‘Blair Witch’ Proclaimed First Internet Movie, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 1999), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-08-17/features/9908170065_1_mark-curcio-amir-
malin-artisan-entertainment [https://perma.cc/MRX4-MKMT]. 
60  Nextmovie Staff, The 12 Ballsiest Movie Publicity Stunts, MTV (July 24, 2013), 
http://www.mtv.com/news/2816554/best-movie-publicity-stunts/ [https://perma.cc/26CD-4Q 
5K] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61  HADLEY CANTRIL, THE INVASION FROM MARS: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PANIC 
WITH THE COMPLETE SCRIPT OF THE FAMOUS ORSON WELLES BROADCAST 3 (1940). 
62  Id. 
63  Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.war-of-the 
-worlds.org/Radio/Newspapers/Oct31/NYT.html [https://perma.cc/Y2V5-VSHY] (last visit-
ed June 24, 2019). 
64  Id. 
65  Exactly what is Satire? Here’s an Answer if You’re Not Too Demanding, NEUTRAL 
GROUND NEWS, https://neutralgroundnews.com/satire-explained/ [https://perma.cc/3VSF-7L 
JZ]. 
66  See Weekly World News, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekly_World_News 
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and local issues.67 Even though its publications are formatted to appear like 
mainstream news articles with headlines, articles, and photographs,68 most 
readers are aware that the Onion’s news articles are satire and meant to enter-
tain. Regardless, there have been a number of embarrassing public instances 
where other news media or prominent persons have believed Weekly World 
News and the Onion’s articles to be true.69 
Fake facts are continuously and, by some accounts, increasingly circulated 
for public consumption. These fake facts are held out as true to either deceive 
or mislead us, induce us to believe, detect plagiarism, or to entertain us. How 
does copyright law deal with these fake facts and how should it? Should copy-
right law protect the fake facts described above, should it protect certain cate-
gories of fake facts, or should copyright law exclude fake facts from its protect-
able subject matter under the factual estoppel doctrine? With advanced digital 
technology, the rise of fake news and deep fakes, and increased and viral peer-
sharing on social media, it is becoming harder to divine fake facts from facts 
and easier for individuals to share fake facts with the world. In light of the re-
cent focus on the issues of fake news and deep fakes by the media and our soci-
ety’s appreciation of new forms of entertainment such as news satire, found-
footage films, and nonfiction novels, this Article provides a timely analysis of 
copyright law’s treatment of fake facts. 
II. COPYRIGHTING FACTS 
Copyright law does not protect facts.70 Facts are discovered rather than au-
thored and, therefore, do not meet copyright’s originality standard. Specifically, 
copyright law only protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium.71 In order to meet copyright’s originality standard, a work must be in-
dependently created and exhibit a modicum of creativity.72 While this standard 
is low, courts have almost consistently held that facts do not meet copyright’s 
 
67  Don’t Get Fooled by These Fake News Sites, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/pic 
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ited Nov. 11, 2019). 
68  See id. 
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Billion of Jetpacks for LAPD, Fire Department, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), https://Latimes 
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lon, Fooled by ‘The Onion’: 9 Most Embarrassing Fails, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 27, 2012), 
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ma.cc/75FX-Q8A8] (some of those instances involved elected officials or popular news 
journals believing headlines that “Planned Parenthood . . . [opens] $8 billion Abortionplex” 
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14, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70  17 USC § 102(b) (2018). 
71  Id. § 102(a). 
72  See id. 
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originality requirement because they are not created and involve no creativity.73 
A fact does not originate with the author of a book that discovers or describes a 
fact; “[t]he discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the facts 
are ‘original’ with him.”74 
Imagine a world where facts can be protected by copyright. This would al-
low the first person who discovers or describes a fact to exclusively control that 
fact and control when and how that fact is shared with the public. Rather than 
promoting “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”75 by increasing our un-
derstanding and knowledge of the world, protecting facts under copyright 
would steal away the “basic building blocks of public discourse,” impede pro-
gress, and harm society more than the copyright balance contemplates.76 Pro-
tecting facts under copyright law could eliminate the freedom to discuss, recast, 
rethink, transform, joke about, and change how facts are presented and used, 
which influences the public’s thoughts and views.77 It would allow private cen-
sors to hinder their critics and impede accurate, contrary, or entertaining dis-
cussions.78 As one commentator explained, 
‘the freedom of access to facts and ideas is the history of democracy’; such free-
dom has promoted theories about freedom of speech, the marketplace of ideas, 
and invigorated democratic dialogue . . . [both] copyright law and . . . the First 
Amendment . . . accept that some information must remain freely accessible and 
usable by all.79 
Therefore, most scholars and courts agree that copyright law should not protect 
facts.80 Even though facts are not protected, an original arrangement of those 
facts, or the way an author expresses those facts, could be subject to copyright 
protection.81 For instance, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enter-
prises, the Court held that President Ford could not prevent anyone from copy-
ing facts from his autobiography, but that he could prevent others from copying 
his expression of facts, such as his “subjective descriptions and portraits of 
public figures.”82 Nevertheless, copyright protection of original arrangements 
 
73  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). 
74  Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting 1 M. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[E], at 2–34 (1980)). 
75  U.S. Const. art. VIII, § 8, cl. 8. 
76  Robert Denicola, News on the Internet, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 68, 
78–79 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: 
From Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95 (1992). 
77  Gordon, supra note 76, at 101. 
78  Id. at 100. 
79  Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 
315 (1991). 
80  See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344–48 (1991); 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the 
Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 445, 450–51 (2001); see also cases Michael Steven 
Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 921 n.8, 921 n.9, 923 n.13 (2003). 
81  Feist Publ’ns., Inc., 499 U.S. at 348. 
82  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 563–64. 
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or expressions of facts is thin.83 Absent wholesale verbatim copying of an au-
thor’s expression of facts, infringement claims involving copying of factual 
works are rarely successful.84 
Fake facts, on the other hand, are created and not discovered, and can often 
be as original and creative as fiction. Technically, fake facts would meet copy-
right’s originality requirement by being independently created and embodying 
more than a modicum of creativity. The only barrier to copyright protection for 
fake facts is copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine. The factual estoppel doc-
trine is a judicial doctrine that treats fake facts as unprotectable facts in in-
fringement cases if the author previously held out those fake facts to the public 
as true.85 In other words, if authors claim that a story, theory, or cosmology is a 
fact, they are factually estopped from changing their position in copyright in-
fringement litigation in order to benefit from the higher protection afforded to 
fictional creative works. As one commentator explained: “[i]f it is a fact, it is 
not protected by copyright; if it is protected by copyright, then it can’t be a fact. 
You can’t have it both ways, and courts will hold you to your original represen-
tation.”86 The factual estoppel doctrine, however, has not been widely accepted. 
Some courts, as described below, fail to recognize or refuse to apply the doc-
trine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts.87 Even courts that have consid-
ered the doctrine are split on what it means for an author to “hold out” their 
work as true, whether the doctrine should apply when there is no reasonable re-
liance on the part of the defendant, and whether the doctrine is most concerned 
with punishing an author’s bad behavior or with protecting a defendant’s rea-
sonable reliance.88 
III. THE INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHTING FAKE FACTS 
In the early 1900s, journalist Action Davies sued the writer and producer of 
the Broadway-play Kindling for copyright infringement.89 Davies alleged that 
Kindling, written by playwright Charles Kenyon and produced by radio-
personality Edward Bowes, infringed a newspaper article Davies wrote and 
published in the Evening Sun.90 Even though Davies had published his news 
article in the Evening Sun as a “real life drama,” he claimed in litigation that it 
was actually fiction.91 Because his news article was fake news, Davies argued 
in his claim against Bowes that the fake news article deserved the same level of 
 
83  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[D] (2016). 
84  Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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86  Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 3 UTAH L. REV. 587, 595 (2007). 
87  See infra Part III. 
88  See infra Part III. 
89  Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
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91  Id. at 54–55. 
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copyright protection as fiction.92 The court disagreed. In Davies v. Bowes, the 
court held that because Davies had published his article as news and the de-
fendants relied on the article as news, Davies was factually estopped from 
claiming his article deserved the higher level of copyright protection afforded 
to fiction.93 This was the first reported case in the U.S. to apply the factual es-
toppel doctrine to deny copyright protection to fake facts held out by the author 
as true. 
Since that first decision in 1913, a handful of courts have applied the factu-
al estoppel doctrine to deny copyright protection to fake news, fake facts and 
events in historical and biographical works, fake entries in phone books and 
maps, and claims of spiritual or divine experiences and revelations.94 At the 
same time, there are cases where courts failed to recognize or refused to apply 
the factual estoppel doctrine and, instead, found fake facts to be as protectable 
as fiction.95 This Part explores the inconsistent and conflicting applications of 
the factual estoppel doctrine, and the main considerations courts use to deter-
mine whether and when the factual estoppel doctrine should apply to treat fake 
facts as unprotectable facts. As evidenced in the cases below, copyright’s pro-
tection of fake facts and the factual estoppel doctrine remain under-theorized 
and under-explained areas of copyright law. 
A. Fake Facts “Held Out as Facts” 
To determine whether copyright should protect fake facts, or if the factual 
estoppel doctrine should treat fake facts as unprotectable facts, a key question 
is whether the author held out fake facts as facts. If an author did not hold out 
fake facts as facts, then those fake facts should generally be protected as fic-
tion. If the author did hold out fake facts as facts, then the factual estoppel doc-
trine should probably apply to exclude those fake facts from copyright protec-
tion. Indeed, according to one court, the determination of whether the work was 
presented to the public as factual is the “single, dispositive determination” to 
applying the factual estoppel doctrine.96 In spite of its importance, “[c]ase law 
has not established the standard for determining whether plaintiff held the 
[work] out as fact [or] fiction,” and courts have been inconsistent in their de-
termination of when fake facts are “held out as” true.97 For instance, what must 
an author do to “hold out” fake facts as facts? In some cases, an author’s ex-
press statements that the work was entirely factual have invoked the factual es-
toppel doctrine.98 In other cases, the mere inclusion of fake facts in a source 
 
92  Id. at 55. 
93  See id. 
94  See infra Part III.A. 
95  See infra Part III.C. 
96  Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 31 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
97  Id. at 28. 
98  See infra Section III.A.1. 
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most people would believe to be true has triggered the factual estoppel doc-
trine.99 
1. Express Statements of Fact 
In situations where authors make express statements that their work is fac-
tual, courts have generally found the factual estoppel doctrine to apply and 
treated fake facts in the authors’ works as unprotectable facts. In Mosley v. Fol-
lett, the court found the author to have held out his work to the public as true 
where he made several express representations that his work was factual.100 In 
Mosley, the author wrote the book The Cat and the Mice based on the activities 
of the German spy John Eppler but added a number of fictional characters and 
incidents in his book.101 The author made a number of representations that The 
Cat and the Mice was factual, including statements in the book’s introduction 
that “[m]ost foreign correspondents . . . eventually came home with half a doz-
en fantastic and yet true spy stories . . . . I was no exception,” and that the sto-
ries in the book involved the author’s “own investigations.”102 The Cat and the 
Mice book jacket proclaimed the book to be “a true, unbelievably exciting spy 
story” and “[a] fascinating story that is fact, but that reads with the pace and 
suspense of the best fiction.”103 The book was written in “[t]he ‘first person’ 
style in which [the author] inserts his own editorial comments as an actual ob-
server” and included a series of “real life photographs.”104 The defendant relied 
on The Cat and the Mice to write his own fictional work.105 When the author 
sued the defendant for infringing his copyright to the fictional characters and 
incidents he added in The Cat and the Mice, the court found that the author had 
held out his work to the public as true, and applied the factual estoppel doctrine 
to treat those fake facts as unprotectable facts.106 
Similarly, in Marshall v. Yates, the author, William Arnold, wrote the book 
Shadowland relaying the life story of Frances Farmer, “an actress and political 
activist who was prominent . . . in the 1930s and 1940s.”107 After being recog-
nized as a Hollywood rising star with a brilliant future ahead of her, Frances 
Farmer was locked up in a state insane asylum and her name erased from Hol-
lywood’s roster, ending her fame abruptly.108 With the exception of eight fake 
 
99  See infra Section III.A.2. 
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facts, Arnold’s Shadowland was largely biographical.109 When the defendant 
produced a film about Farmer’s life and incorporated facts from Arnold’s 
Shadowland, Arnold sued the defendant alleging that his film infringed Ar-
nold’s copyright in Shadowland.110 In its decision, the court found Arnold to 
have presented his book as nonfiction, including presenting the fake facts in his 
book as facts, where “[t]he book itself purports to be a true story. It was re-
leased to the public as a non-fiction work. All of the promotional materials and 
reviews of the book treated it as nonfiction.”111 In Houts v. Universal City Stu-
dios, the court came to the same conclusion when the author’s book Where 
Death Delights included statements that the story was “one of the most absorb-
ing books on true crime ever published and truth can be more brutal than fic-
tion,” and indicated on the spine of the paperback edition of the book that it 
was “N-F,” non-fiction.112 
In Oliver v. Saint Germain Foundation, Frederick Spencer Oliver authored 
a book titled A Dweller of Two Planets, which was dictated to him by the spirit 
of a dead man, a “superior spiritual being.”113 In the book, Oliver dedicated at 
least six pages to convincing his readers that the spiritual-being, Phylos, dictat-
ed the story to him and that the story was factual.114 These statements included 
the preface stating that “the following book . . . is absolute revelation; that I do 
not believe myself its Author, but that one of those mysterious persons . . . an 
adept of the arcane and occult in the universe . . . is the Author. Such is the fact. 
The book was revealed to me.”115 According to the Oliver court, Oliver held 
out his work to the public as true in order to “induce those who might read to 
believe that it was dictated by a superior spiritual being” and to “give the book 
an origin similar to that claimed by the followers of Joseph Smith in the Book 
of Mormons, the Koran by the followers of Mohammed.”116 The court applied 
the factual estoppel doctrine to treat the revelations in A Dweller of Two Plan-
ets as unprotectable facts, even though the court admitted that a reasonable 
reader might not believe the work was factual.117 
In Silva v. MacLaine, Silva wrote the book Date with the Gods detailing 
his experience meeting an extraterrestrial woman in Peru.118 The book included 
the extraterrestrial’s explanations about UFOs, astral projection (out of body 
travel while attached by a silver chain), and other divine experiences.119 The 
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defendant, MacLaine, published the book Out On A Limb, in which MacLaine 
discusses a trip she took with Silva to Peru where they both met up with the 
same extraterrestrial woman.120 MacLaine’s book describes her experiences in 
Peru and her own astral projection.121 Silva sued MacLaine for infringing Date 
with the Gods.122 Ruling for MacLaine, the court explained, 
Silva seems intent on relating his experience at meeting an extraterrestrial who, 
in this [litigation], he for the first time declares is a literary device and was not 
real. The clear implication of the book is that he actually met an extraterrestrial 
and is conveying her teachings to his readers.123 
In Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, the court found enough evidence that the au-
thor held out his work as being true when he claimed to have “discovered” hu-
man ego fixations that “are based upon our proven scientific knowledge,” and 
that the entire ego fixation system described in his book was “scientific, prova-
ble in the laboratory and clinically” and is “a discovery as scientific discoveries 
are, with exactly the same qualification of being verifiable and objective.”124 
Finally, in Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the defendant used 
the author Stuart N. Lake’s book Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshall to produce a 
radio show.125 Wyatt Earp was an American frontier lawman, saloonkeeper, 
gambler, miner, and bouncer who was known as Old West’s “toughest and 
deadliest gunman” of his day.126 Lake’s best-selling book was adapted into a 
number of movies and television shows.127 In Lake, the court found Lake to 
have held out his story of Wyatt Earp to be true where the author declared in 
the book’s preface that the book was “an accurate historical biography based on 
a factual account of Wyatt Earp’s career and ‘in no part a mythic tale.’ ”128 The 
court found Lake to have held out his book as true even though most people 
recognize that “an element of fictionalization in recounting the life of a great 
western hero is almost de rigueur.”129 Lake later admitted that many of the 
quotes by Wyatt Earp in his book were fake, and the book today is considered 
largely fictional.130 
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2.  Implications of Fact 
The cases above seem to demonstrate that, where authors expressly state 
that the fake facts in their works are true, courts have generally found them to 
have “held out” their work to the public as true.131 But absent an express state-
ment of facts, some courts have found that implied representations of fact by 
authors can also lead to findings that they held out their works as true. These 
implications can be from the genre or style of the work or even where and how 
the fake facts were published. For instance, in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., the court found the stories in the book Test Pilot to be held out as 
true where Collins’s wife published a collection of “flying stories or air stories” 
written by her test-pilot-late husband.132 These short stories recounted the test 
pilot’s childhood, school, and “vivid descriptions of many of his own flights 
. . . his more spectacular test dives” and “his own prophetic account of his last 
test dive, concluding with the words ‘I am dead now.’ ”133 When Collins’s wife 
sued Metro-Goldwyn for infringing her husband’s stories in Metro-Goldwyn’s 
motion picture Test Pilot, the court applied the factual estoppel doctrine to find 
the stories not protected by copyright because “[i]t is . . . apparent from the 
very nature of Collins’[s] articles that they are largely a recitation of actual 
facts.”134 The court even refused to find copyright infringement where the de-
fendant recreated a death scene in its motion picture based on the pilot’s proph-
ecy of his own death.135 
Similarly, in the 1913 Davies v. Bowes case mentioned above, Davies 
wrote “[a] Massachusetts real life drama which eclipses the plot of ‘The 
Thief’ ” under the News of the Theater column for the Evening Sun.136 Davies 
“cast [the story] in the form of an actual occurrence because he thought it more 
striking.”137 Even though the short story did not include statements expressly 
claiming to be true, the court found Davies to have held out the story as true 
“because [][the story] was printed as news; it was presented to the public as 
matter of fact and not of fiction; the readers of the Sun were invited to believe 
it.”138 Davies might have claimed that he held out the work as true intending to 
entertain his readers, but the court ascribed Davies’s action to “attracting atten-
tion and lending interest to an alleged occurrence which if told as fiction would 
have been tawdry and unconvincing.”139 
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In other cases, courts have assumed fake facts were held out as facts mere-
ly because they were published in sources that most readers would believe to be 
factual instead of fiction, such as a telephone book, encyclopedia, test prepara-
tion text, or map. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. in-
volved fake names and telephone listings in a phone book.140 In Feist Publica-
tions, Inc., Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement when Feist copied 
Rural’s telephone directory.141 Rural was the sole provider of telephone service 
in its service area and published a telephone directory of the names and phone 
numbers for its service area.142 Feist published larger area-wide telephone di-
rectories and paid regional telephone companies like Rural to obtain white pag-
es listings.143 After Rural refused to license its listings to Feist, Feist went 
ahead and copied Rural’s white pages, listing the names and telephone numbers 
of all of Rural’s subscribers.144 Rural discovered Feist’s copying when the lat-
ter’s telephone directory included four “fictitious listings that Rural had insert-
ed into its directory to detect copying.”145 While recognizing that facts are not 
copyrightable, the Court’s decision failed to address Rural’s four fake listings. 
Instead, the Court found all of Rural’s telephone listings—the actual listings as 
well as the four fake listings—to be unprotectable facts.146 The Court’s decision 
to ignore Rural’s four fake listings, and to analyze them no differently than ac-
tual listings, implicitly applied the factual estoppel doctrine.147 
Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co. involved fake facts in an encyclopedia.148 
Fred L. Worth spent over six years researching and eventually publishing two 
encyclopedias on trivia in 1977 and 1981.149 The creators of the popular board 
game Trivial Pursuit relied on Worth’s encyclopedias to create up to 27.9 per-
cent of the questions and answers in three game editions.150 Trivial Pursuit cop-
ied facts from Worth’s encyclopedias as well as at least one fake fact that 
Worth had included in his encyclopedia to detect copying.151 Specifically, 
Worth included the fake fact that the 1970s TV detective Columbo’s first name 
was Philip.152 When Trivial Pursuit included a card revealing that Columbo’s 
 
140  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
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first name was Philip, Worth sued for copyright infringement.153 In upholding 
the lower court’s dismissal of Worth’s infringement claim, the court affirmed 
that Trivial Pursuit’s “use of the factual content in Worth’s books does not con-
stitute infringement.”154 The court even went as far as explaining that “[t]he 
verbatim repetition of certain words in order to use the nonprotectible facts is 
also noninfringing . . . ‘indispensable expression’ of particular facts or ide-
as.”155 Like the decision in Feist, the court’s opinion never addressed Trivial 
Pursuit’s copying of Worth’s fake fact, thereby treating that fake fact as an un-
protectable fact. 
The court in Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co. took the same 
approach when it was faced with an author’s assertion of “common errors of 
fact appearing in both [the author’s and the defendant’s] books.”156 The author 
and the defendant were both publishers of history outlines and other condensed 
books on history for students and teachers.157 The court explained that the 
common errors of fact appearing in the author’s Visualized American History 
and the defendant’s Visualized Units in American History “only served to show 
[defendant’s] use of the plaintiff’s book and not necessarily that what they 
wrote infringed the copyright, for historical facts are not copyrightable per se 
nor are errors in fact.”158 A similar result occurred in Nester’s Map & Guide 
Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., where the court found the mapmaker to have held 
out the “obscure and erroneous” street and building listings in its street guide 
and map to be true merely because those fake facts were included in a publica-
tion titled “Official New York Taxi Driver’s Guide.”159 
Whether an author held out fake facts as facts is one of the most important 
considerations when deciding whether to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to 
treat fake facts as unprotectable facts. However, prior case law provides no 
clear guidance to courts, litigants, authors, or the creative industry on how to 
determine whether authors held out their works to the public as true, how clear 
authors must be about the fictionalized elements in their largely nonfiction 
work, and whether defendants can rely on authors’ implied representations that 
their works are factual. This lack of clarity can be harmful to authors that ficti-
tiously hold out their works as fiction in order to entertain, such as works of 
historical fiction, found-footage films, or satire news. If there is no guidance on 
what constitutes holding out a work as factual, it is possible that the novel mar-
keting of The Blair Witch Project could subject the movie to the factual estop-
pel doctrine, the Onion’s style of satirical news could render its articles unpro-
tectable by copyright law, or works such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock 
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Holmes stories—which are presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson—
could be treated as unprotectable facts because they were held out as true. 
B. Defendant’s “Reasonable Reliance” 
An area of even greater conflict in factual estoppel case law is whether a 
defendant accused of infringing an author’s fake facts is required to have rea-
sonably relied on the author’s fake facts as facts for factual estoppel to apply. 
In deciding whether the factual estoppel doctrine applies to treat fake facts as 
unprotectable facts, some courts have required a defendant to prove reliance.160 
Some courts have even required defendants to show that their reliance was rea-
sonable.161 Other courts have explicitly rejected the requirement that defendant 
prove that they relied on the fake facts as facts, and have even found the factual 
estoppel doctrine to apply to clearly absurd fake facts that no reasonable person 
would believe were true.162 
1. Reasonable Reliance Required 
A handful of courts require that a defendant reasonably relied on the fake 
facts as facts for the factual estoppel doctrine to apply. In Mosely v. Follett, 
discussed above, the court determined that the defendant had reasonably relied 
on the author’s representations that the work was factual when the defendant 
wrote and published a fictional work based on a spy character and episode from 
the author’s book.163 The court focused on the defendant’s reliance and found it 
to be reasonable in light of the classification of the author’s work by the Li-
brary of Congress and other libraries as nonfiction, and the treatment of the 
work by book reviewers as being nonfiction.164 
The court in Marshall v. Yates similarly endorsed the reasonable reliance 
requirement for factual estoppel. As discussed above, in Marshall, the author’s 
biography of Frances Farmer, Shadowland, was released to the public as non-
fiction, and all of the promotional materials and reviews of the book treated the 
book as nonfiction.165 Based largely on research from Shadowland, the defend-
ants wrote a movie script and produced a movie about Frances Farmer.166 The 
author sued defendants for copyright infringement, claiming that even though 
the work was largely biographical, the author had included at least eight fic-
tionalized elements in Shadowland that the defendants had copied and used in 
their movie.167 The Marshall court found reliance because there was no “suffi-
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cient showing that defendants in fact knew that these portions of the book were 
fabricated by [the author].”168 The court further described the defendants’ reli-
ance to be reasonable because Shadowland “was not so clearly incredible that 
defendants should have been put on notice that portions were fictionalized.”169 
The court’s statement indicated that had Shadowland been “so clearly incredi-
ble,” the defendants could not have reasonably relied on the fake facts as facts 
and the factual estoppel doctrine would not apply.170 
2. Reasonable Reliance Not Required 
Other courts have explicitly rejected the requirement that the defendant 
show reliance, finding that the defendant’s reliance that the work was factual is 
not relevant to application of the factual estoppel doctrine. These courts seem 
to embrace the argument that factual estoppel is triggered purely by the au-
thor’s bad behavior and not by the defendant’s reliance. In Arica Institute, Inc. 
v. Palmer, the plaintiff-institute published books by its founder, Oscar Ichazo, 
which provided teachings on psychological self-help.171 The Arica System, 
embodied in the Arica training manuals and books, is based on the teaching that 
the human body and psyche consists of nine systems.172 Those systems can be-
come imbalanced by “ego fixations,” including indolence, resentment, flattery, 
vanity, melancholy, stinginess, cowardice, planning, and vengeance.173 Arica’s 
manuals and books used diagrams, including nine-point figures enclosed in a 
circle called “enneagons,” to illustrate humanity’s nine ego-fixations.174 The 
plaintiffs claimed to have “discovered” these ego fixations as “scientifically 
verifiable ‘facts’ of the human nature,” which were based on “proven scientific 
knowledge . . . provable in the laboratory and clinically,” constituting “a dis-
covery as scientific discoveries are, with exactly the same qualifications of be-
ing verifiable and objective.”175 As of 1992, there were approximately forty 
Arica training centers in the United States, South America, Europe, and Aus-
tralia.176 Helen Palmer, an attendee at Ichazo’s trainings, wrote and published 
her own book, The Enneagram: Understanding Yourself and the Others in Your 
Life, based on the teachings of Ichazo and Arica’s manuals and books.177 Palm-
er’s book included Arica’s enneagrams and ego fixations and theories.178 The 
Arica Institute sued Palmer for copyright infringement.179 After finding that 
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Arica held out its ego-fixations and theories as facts, the court applied the fac-
tual estoppel doctrine to deny Arica from claiming copyright protection over 
the ego-fixations, even though the court admitted that “a reasonable reader 
might not believe the representation.”180 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the 
fact that a reasonable person may not believe the fake facts “does not negate the 
estoppel.”181 
In Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the court was even clearer in its re-
jection of the idea that defendant’s reasonable reliance is necessary for factual 
estoppel to apply. Specifically, the Houts court held that factual estoppel is 
“created solely by plaintiff’s affirmative action and representation that the work 
was factual.”182 In Houts, the author wrote and published the book Where 
Death Delights, the story of Dr. Milton H. Helpern, chief medical examiner of 
the City of New York.183 The defendants created and produced a television se-
ries, Quincy, based on the author’s book.184 The author sued the writers and 
producers of the TV show Quincy, claiming that Where Death Delights is “an 
amalgam of fact and fiction, and hence it is entitled to full copyright protec-
tion.”185 After finding that the author held out his book as being factual, the 
court rejected the author’s argument that defendants must show reliance as a 
necessary element to apply the factual estoppel doctrine.186 The court went so 
far as to state that even clearly absurd stories that are “ludicrous to the average 
reader” do not overcome the evidence that the author expressly held out the 
work as being factual.187 In other words, defendants need not show that they 
relied on the work as factual, nor do defendants need to show that their reliance 
was reasonable. 
Courts’ conflicting requirements for defendants to assert the factual estop-
pel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts can cause some absurd 
consequences. Take, for instance, fake facts that have been publicly debunked. 
If a playwright now wants to create a drama based on Greg Mortenson’s Three 
Cups of Tea, would that playwright need to seek permission from Mortenson 
before recreating an episode where a character is similarly captured by the Tal-
iban? Now that the episode has been publicly debunked as fake, does it regain 
its protection under copyright because no one can claim anymore to reasonably 
rely on the episode as factual? For courts that require reliance to be reasonable, 
how “clearly incredible” or absurd must the author’s story be for the defend-
ant’s reliance to be considered unreasonable? For instance, the plot of the film 
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Return of the Living Dead is clearly ridiculous to the average audience, but it is 
published with the statement that “[t]he events portrayed in this film are all 
true. The names are real names of real people and real organizations.”188 Have 
the publishers of this film held out their work as being factual with this express 
statement of fact, or should the film’s ridiculous plot—involving the dead com-
ing back to life as bloodthirsty, flesh-eating monsters—overcome its express 
statement? 
C. Fake Facts Protected as Fiction 
In addition to the uncertainty within decisions applying the factual estoppel 
doctrine, some courts fail to recognize, refuse to apply, or reject the doctrine 
altogether. For instance, in De Acosta v. Brown, the author wrote a screenplay 
titled Angel in Service based on the life of Clara Barton, founder of the Ameri-
can Red Cross.189 Even though the screenplay was primarily based on Barton’s 
life, in order to make her “biographical screen play palatable to the movie audi-
ences of America,” the author added a number of fictional elements to her 
work.190 These “heart interest[s]” included giving Barton a fictional lover, in-
venting a fake letter, falsifying a controversy with the school board, creating a 
fictional villain, and other fake facts.191 The defendant, Beth Brown, wrote her 
own biographical work about Clara Barton and published extracts from her 
work in Cosmopolitan magazine’s “The Nonfiction Book Digest.”192 Brown’s 
work used the author’s screenplay as a source for information and copied ap-
proximately seven fake facts the author had included in her screenplay.193 The 
De Acosta court found Brown’s work to infringe the author’s screenplay be-
cause, according to the court, “original treatment of the life of a historic charac-
ter, like such treatment of any material even in the public domain, is entitled to 
protection against appropriation by others.”194 The court did not consider 
whether the author had held out her screenplay as representing the true story of 
Clara Barton, or whether Brown had reasonably believed the screenplay to be a 
factual account of Barton’s life when Brown adopted it. Indeed, in light of 
Brown’s use of the screenplay as a source for her own nonfiction biography 
about Barton, it is likely that Brown believed the author’s work to be a true ac-
count of Barton’s life. 
Another court refused to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to fake facts by 
categorizing fake facts as assertions of belief rather than assertions of fact. In 
Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 
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the author made statements that Jesus Christ dictated the script for her book, A 
Course in Miracles, which was held out as a “non-sectarian, non-
denominational spiritual teaching” that included “numerous psychological 
terms and ideas, such as denial, projection, dissociation, and hallucination.”195 
Despite being factually analogous to some of the cases described above, the 
court in Penguin Books refused to find that the author held out her work as fac-
tual.196 The Penguin Books court criticized or distinguished past courts’ appli-
cations of the factual estoppel doctrine in similar spiritual cases.197 In the case 
of Oliver, for instance, the Penguin Books court found Oliver’s application of 
the factual estoppel doctrine to be bizarre and echoed criticism “wonder[ing] 
whether the Oliver court would have invoked the same [factual estoppel] de-
fense against Sir Arthur Conan Doyle on the grounds his ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
stories are presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson.”198 The court conclud-
ed by finding the factual estoppel doctrine inapplicable in Penguin Books be-
cause the author’s representation of fact was “a claim based on faith” and much 
of the book was “prescriptive rather than descriptive.”199 
Similarly, in the recent Gerald Brittle v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 
dispute, the court failed to recognize the factual estoppel doctrine when it de-
nied Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss.200 Gerald Brittle published the book 
The Demonologist in 1980 about the adventures of paranormal investigators Ed 
and Lorraine Warren.201 The Warrens “investigat[ed] hauntings and work[ed] 
with church officials to exorcise demons.”202 One of their most infamous ad-
ventures was their 1972 investigation of a haunting at the West Point military 
academy.203 The Demonologist was marketed as and purported to be a true ac-
count of events in the Warrens’ lives.204 Each chapter of The Demonologist 
highlighted an episode of the Warrens’ paranormal investigations, and the book 
included real-life photographs by the Warrens and dialogue “supported by first-
person testimony by witnesses, and/or tape recordings the Warrens made on the 
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scene while phenomena were in progress.”205 Brittle included statements in the 
preface of The Demonologist that “all the information presented in this book is 
true,” “[t]hese are real cases that happened to real people,” “[g]reat care has 
been taken . . . to include only those cases in the Warrens’ files that were wit-
nessed by ordained clergymen and exorcists,” and “[i]t should . . . be stressed 
that there is no exaggeration . . . [in] this book.”206 
After Warner Brothers released the blockbuster movie, The Conjuring, 
based on the Warrens’ paranormal investigations, Brittle sued Warner Brothers 
for copyright infringement.207 Warner Brothers moved to dismiss Brittle’s 
complaint on the ground that any similarities between Brittle’s book and The 
Conjuring movie were based on facts, which were unprotected by copyright.208 
Warner Brothers argued that for decades Brittle told the public that the factual 
details in his book were true, and that these unprotectable “facts” cannot form 
the basis of a copyright infringement claim.209 The court, however, denied 
Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss because it “decline[d] the parties’ invita-
tion to wade into the truth or falsity of the Warrens’ paranormal escapades . . . 
at this stage of the case. This type of analysis, which b[ore] on evidence pre-
sented and factual determinations, [was] better suited for summary judgment or 
trial.”210 In other words, instead of looking at whether Brittle had held out his 
accounts of the Warrens’ paranormal investigations in The Demonologist as 
factual and, therefore, possibly unprotectable under the factual estoppel doc-
trine, the court’s opinion indicated that it would eventually need to determine 
the truth or falsity of the facts presented in The Demonologist. Under the factu-
al estoppel doctrine, however, the court should never need to “wade into the 
truth or falsity” of the events in The Demonologist; the court would merely 
need to determine whether Brittle was factually estopped from asserting that his 
work was fiction and entitled to a higher level of copyright protection. 
Courts and litigants do not always recognize the factual estoppel doctrine, 
or the idea that fake facts—when held out by their author as facts—may not de-
serve the same level of copyright protection as fiction. If courts are not willing 
to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts, 
authors that wish to rely on factual works would need to take extra care and due 
diligence to ensure that the works they rely upon are truly and one-hundred 
percent factual. This inability to rely on the factual estoppel doctrine creates 
uncertainty, inefficiency, and additional burdens for authors who wish to use 
other authors’ factual assertions to create secondary works. 
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IV. JUSTIFYING FACTUAL ESTOPPEL 
If fake facts are created, and copyright is designed to encourage and pro-
mote creativity, why not protect fake facts as fiction under copyright law? 
Copyright is traditionally justified in the U.S. under a utilitarian theory: copy-
right incentivizes authors to create expressive works that benefit society.211 If 
authors cannot rely on the exclusivity to their works granted to them by copy-
right law, the assumption is that they may not create expressive works because 
they will have no way of preventing others from copying them. In terms of fake 
facts, do the justifications for copyright prevail over denying protection to fake 
facts under the factual estoppel doctrine? 
A. Benefits of Factual Estoppel 
There are many benefits to applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat 
fake facts as unprotectable facts, including promoting efficiency, fairness, and 
production of socially valuable secondary works. Authors of fake facts should 
not be able to benefit from their deceptions; and the factual estoppel doctrine, if 
standardized, could marginally deter authors from creating fake facts in the first 
place. Further, factual estoppel promotes efficiency by allowing creators to rely 
on authors’ representations instead of expending time and energy attempting to 
distinguish fake facts from facts; it protects later creators from copyright liabil-
ity when they rely on works that authors hold out as being factual, and it spares 
courts the effort of attempting to distinguish protected fiction from unprotected 
fact. 
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Efficiency and Production of 
Socially Valuable Works 
One of the most important reasons for excluding fake facts from copyright 
protection is that such exclusion promotes efficiency and dissemination of pub-
lic knowledge by allowing later creators to rely on factual works to create sec-
ondary works. Without the factual estoppel doctrine, authors who wish to rely 
on prior works for research or creation would need to “engage in difficult and 
often irresolvable empirical inquiries in order to determine copyrightability.”212 
As the court in Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co. noted, 
To treat ‘false’ facts interspersed among actual facts and represented as actual 
facts as fiction would mean that no one could ever reproduce or copy actual 
facts without risk of reproducing a false fact and thereby violating a copyright. If 
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such were the law, information could never be reproduced or widely disseminat-
ed.213 
If later creators are required to expend the time and labor to parse fiction 
from fact and can never be certain that they are copying only unprotectable 
facts, those later creators may be less inclined to create secondary works in the 
first place. This could “unduly chill authors seeking to write about historical 
issues or events,” and it could “inhibit the production of socially valuable sec-
ondary works,” and diminish rather than promote public knowledge.214 The fac-
tual estoppel doctrine, which treats fake facts as unprotectable facts, spares lat-
er creators from having to expend the extraneous labor of sifting through a 
supposed factual work to distinguish protected fiction from unprotected fact. 
The doctrine also removes the uncertainty that a later creator may inadvertently 
infringe an author’s copyright if certain factual accounts in the author’s work 
later turn out to be fake. 
2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Judicial Efficiency 
In addition to making it more efficient for secondary creators to use factual 
works, the factual estoppel doctrine also promotes judicial efficiency by allow-
ing courts to dispose of copyright infringement cases without having to under-
take complex analyses parsing protected fiction from unprotected fact. For in-
stance, as discussed above, Brittle alleged in Gerald Brittle v. Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Inc. that Warner Brothers’ movie The Conjuring infringed Brit-
tle’s copyright in his nonfiction book, The Demonologist.215 Like The Conjur-
ing, The Demonologist tells the “true” stories of the Warrens’ paranormal in-
vestigations of hauntings and their encounters with ghosts.216 The court denied 
Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss Brittle’s copyright infringement claim be-
cause the court was not yet ready to engage in the difficult and fact-intensive 
inquiry into “the truth or falsity of the Warrens’ paranormal escapades.”217 
However, if the court applied the factual estoppel doctrine, the court would 
never need to engage in the difficult task of “wad[ing] into the truth or falsi-
ty”218 of the events described in Brittle’s book; it would merely need to deter-
mine whether the factual estoppel doctrine applied to treat Brittle’s entire work 
as a factual work, limiting the copyright protection to only original expression 
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or arrangement. At the same time, the factual estoppel doctrine will also pre-
vent courts from having to wade into the difficult task of distinguishing truth 
from falsity in claims involving spiritual or religious texts. Instead of requiring 
judges to adjudicate whether specific facts—such as divine revelations or reli-
gious facts—are true, which could trigger Establishment Clause concerns,219 
courts can instead apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat the entire religious 
text as a factual work. This would limit copyright protection to only original 
expression or arrangement, if any, of the “facts.” 
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine May Marginally Deter Creation of 
Fake Facts 
Like unclean hands, the factual estoppel doctrine might even “increase[] 
the cost of making false representations of fact and therefore may marginally 
deter such statements.”220 Fake facts, when held out as true, are generally bad 
for society. We read the news or nonfiction works in order to be informed and 
to learn about or find meaning in the world. Fake facts create a false record and 
can contribute to the distortion of history. Fake facts could also be adopted and 
repeated and recited as true, resulting in falsification of the historical record. 
Therefore, deterring authors from creating fake facts “is a positive conse-
quence, for both deontological and utilitarian reasons.”221 Instead of rewarding 
authors with copyright protection of their created fake facts, the law should de-
ter this type of behavior and any doctrine that even marginally deters fake 
facts’ creation should be considered. In spite of this endorsement, the factual 
estoppel doctrine’s ability to deter authors from creating fake facts is unclear. 
Because application of the factual estoppel doctrine merely grants fake facts the 
same scope of copyright protection they would have enjoyed had they been 
facts, it is unclear how excluding fake facts from copyright law deters authors 
from creating fake facts because those authors are not losing any protection 
they otherwise would have had. 
4. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Is Fair 
The factual estoppel doctrine is fair and, like unclean hands, enforces “eq-
uity and good morals.”222 Authors should not be able to reap the benefits of 
marketing their work as factual, but turn around and declare it as fiction in or-
der to benefit again in a copyright infringement suit. In other words, “[t]here is 
no unfairness in holding people to their word.”223 In Davies v. Bowes, discussed 
above, the court justified applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat Da-
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vies’s fake news article as factual because “it is a matter of morals that he who 
puts forth a thing as verity shall not be heard to allege for profit that it is fic-
tion.”224 Specifically, “because [the story] was printed as news; it was present-
ed to the public as matter of fact and not of fiction; the readers of the Sun were 
invited to believe it,” Davies, therefore, should not be able to turn around and 
claim the story to be fiction in order to profit from the defendant’s use of his 
story.225 This result—preventing an author from benefitting from claiming their 
work to be true and claiming their work to be fake—is fair. 
5. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Upholds Reasonable Expectations 
The factual estoppel doctrine also upholds parties’ reasonable expectations 
and protects defendants that rely on authors’ representations of fact. Once fac-
tual estoppel is established, an author’s fake facts are treated as facts, limiting 
the protectable elements of the author’s work to the expression or original ar-
rangement of those facts.226 This significantly decreases the chance that an au-
thor, who holds out fiction as fact, will succeed in a copyright infringement 
case unless the defendant wholesale appropriated the expression or arrange-
ment of those fake facts. The author’s expectations are met in this situation be-
cause copyright does not protect facts, so authors that hold fake facts out as 
facts should not reasonably expect copyright to protect those facts. Similarly, a 
defendant’s expectations are also upheld because they expected to be able to 
use facts without incurring copyright liability. On the other hand, where a de-
fendant wholesale appropriates an author’s work, including the author’s origi-
nal expression and arrangement, that defendant could still be liable for copy-
right infringement. For instance, even though it becomes very difficult to 
protect a work under copyright once a court applies the factual estoppel doc-
trine, it is not impossible. In Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, the Urantia 
Foundation held out the plot of its spiritual guidebooks as having been authored 
by spiritual beings.227 Maaherra copied verbatim the entire Urantia Book, in-
cluding the selection and arrangement of the revelations within the Book, and 
distributed it on computer disks.228 The court explained that, while the divine 
revelations in the Book were divine “facts” that “would be analogous to a 
‘fact,’ and which of course would not be copyrightable[,]” in this case, Maaher-
ra copied more than just the facts—but also the original expression, selection, 
and arrangement of those facts, which copyright law protects.229 
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B. Consequences of Factual Estoppel 
At the same time, applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts 
as unprotectable facts could have unintended consequences, including increas-
ing the dissemination of fake facts, stripping away copyright protection of fic-
tional works that rely on facts for entertainment, and denying protection to 
original expression or arrangement of fake facts. 
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could, Theoretically, Increase 
Dissemination of Fake Facts 
Some commentators express concern that factual estoppel may increase the 
dissemination of fake facts.230 If fake facts are not protected by copyright, then 
subsequent authors may repeat an author’s fake facts without incurring copy-
right liability. Some argue that this could increase the dissemination of fake 
facts as well as multiply the sources reciting those fake facts.231 This result is 
contrary to copyright’s goal of excluding facts, which—according to some—is 
to “provide consumers with accurate information at the lowest cost.”232 This 
was a concern expressed by the court in Belcher v. Tarbox regarding denying 
copyright to fraudulent material; the court in that case stated that “[c]opyright 
protection restricts permissible publication. We fail to see what public policy 
would be served by eliminating this restriction in the case of fraudulent matter 
and permitting it to be reprinted and circulated freely.”233 Analogizing the 
Belcher court’s concern to denying copyright to fake facts would mean that to 
treat fake facts as unprotectable facts could permit those fake facts to be re-
printed and circulated freely, which would not serve public policy. While treat-
ing fake facts as unprotectable facts could theoretically allow the duplication or 
increase the dissemination of fake facts, the solution to this concern is not to 
protect fake facts under copyright law. Protecting fake facts under copyright 
only serves to punish gullible defendants that rely on authors holding out their 
works as factual. It also allows authors, whose intent was to dupe the public 
and benefit from claiming that their works are factual, to benefit again in in-
fringement litigation against unwitting defendants. This result is not only unfair 
but would also create uncertainty that later authors may face copyright liability 
for inadvertently using fake facts in their secondary works, and potentially chill 
the production of these socially valuable secondary works. 
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2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Negatively Affect Production of 
Certain Genres of Works 
Some commentators are concerned that applying the factual estoppel doc-
trine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts could negatively affect production 
of certain genres or categories of works. For instance, when courts extend the 
factual estoppel doctrine to deem “a work ‘factual’ regardless of the author’s 
intentions[,]” they may negatively affect semi-fabricated works “that (ficti-
tiously) claim to tell a true story” for entertainment purposes.234 The court in 
Garman v. Sterling Publishing Co. expressed the concern that the factual es-
toppel doctrine “could hinder the goals of the Copyright Act by providing a dis-
incentive to produce certain works,” citing as an example “an author of histori-
cal fiction might jeopardize her copyright if she attributed fictitious dialogue to 
historical characters.”235 
Consider The Blair Witch Project’s innovative marketing scheme, where 
producers portrayed the events in their found-footage film as being real in vari-
ous online sources.236 By marketing the work as a true story for the purpose of 
entertainment, a court could apply the factual estoppel doctrine to exclude the 
plot or events in the movie from copyright protection. Taking this argument to 
the extreme could mean works such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock 
Holmes series, written from the perspective of fictional-biographer Dr. Wat-
son,237 or books like Jim Fergus’s One Thousand White Women: The Journals 
of May Dodd, written as the discovered journal of fictional character May 
Dodd, could be subject to the factual estoppel doctrine and not protected by 
copyright.238 Indeed, it would be contrary to copyright policy if “the result of 
applying copyright estoppel in the case of a literary or artistic hoax . . . could 
overdeter legitimate behavior.”239 
These concerns, while legitimate, are avoidable. If courts apply factual es-
toppel consistently using the framework laid out at the end of this Article, and 
authors take the precautionary measure of including disclaimers about the fic-
tional aspects of their works, those works are not likely to be subject to the fac-
tual estoppel doctrine. Indeed, because the new framework discussed below 
takes into consideration objective evidence regarding an author’s intent, fic-
tional works written like nonfiction in order to entertain would not likely be 
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subject to the factual estoppel doctrine unless they are clearly held out as non-
fiction and have the potential to deceive more than a de minimis portion of the 
public. 
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Deny Protection to Original 
Arrangement or Expression of Fake Facts 
One commentator claims that once a court finds that factual estoppel ap-
plies, “the work is generally not protected at all . . . because the party to whom 
factual estoppel applies never will have made the alternative argument that its 
work was factual. If it had, then factual estoppel would not apply in the first in-
stance.”240 This would mean that even if a defendant wholesale copied the au-
thor’s work, once a court determines that factual estoppel applies, that defend-
ant is not likely to be liable for infringement of the plaintiff’s original 
expression or arrangement of fake facts. While most cases applying the factual 
estoppel doctrine do indeed result in findings of noninfringement, this is not 
always the case. 
For instance, in Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, discussed above, the 
court applied the factual estoppel doctrine to find that the individual revelations 
recited in the plaintiff’s spiritual guides were not protectable under copyright 
law, but that the defendant had infringed the original selection and arrangement 
of those revelations, which was protected as a copyrightable compilation.241 
Similarly, in Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., the court de-
nied copyright protection of the “obscure and erroneous listings” the plaintiff 
planted in its map under the factual estoppel doctrine.242 However, even treat-
ing those fake facts as facts, the court in Nester acknowledged that the author’s 
“list of numbers in its street address guide may be copyrightable not because 
the statements are fictional but because of the originality in selecting and as-
signing them to particular cross streets.”243 The court in Garman v. Sterling 
Publishing Co., Inc. came to the same conclusion where the author and pub-
lisher of the book Gem Elixirs and Vibrational Healing sued the defendant-
author of Crystal Workbook for copyright infringement.244 The court admitted 
that “[a]lthough the ‘factual’ contentions advanced in both Gem Elixirs and 
Crystal Workbook are undoubtedly fanciful, they are still represented as facts. 
As such, subsequent researchers in this field of pseudoscience had a right to 
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make use of the facts and ideas contained in plaintiff’s work.”245 The court, 
however, refused to grant the defendant summary judgment because the author 
showed “sufficient evidence of copying of expressive elements of both the 
prose and the charts” from the author’s book.246 Therefore, even though appli-
cation of the factual estoppel doctrine makes finding copyright infringement 
significantly more difficult, it is not a blanket defense for infringing defendants. 
While there could be unintended consequences from applying the factual 
estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as facts, those consequences are minimal 
when compared with the efficiency, fairness, and social benefits in allowing 
later creators to rely on “facts” in their secondary works without worrying that 
those facts may be protected by copyright.247 On balance, the public interests of 
efficiency, fairness, and promoting production of socially valuable secondary 
works are better served when courts apply factual estoppel to treat fake facts as 
unprotectable facts in copyright infringement cases involving copying of fake 
facts. 
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE FACTUAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE 
Having established that the public’s interest is better served when courts 
apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts, the 
next issue is how courts should determine when to apply the factual estoppel 
doctrine. The inconsistent treatment of fake facts under copyright law and the 
conflicting recognition and application of the factual estoppel doctrine can 
cause uncertainty to courts, litigants, authors, and the creative industry. Future 
authors who want to rely on factual works for research or inspiration can never 
be certain that they will not face liability for copying protected fiction, and liti-
gants and courts waste valuable time and energy attempting to prove and parse 
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fiction from fact. Based on past case law and incorporating elements from other 
areas of the law, including false advertising, trademark infringement, and the 
equitable estoppel defense, this Part recommends a new practical and consistent 
framework for courts going forward to determine when the factual estoppel 
doctrine should apply to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts in copyright in-
fringement cases. 
When an author files a copyright infringement action accusing a defendant 
of copying fake facts or fictionalized elements of a nonfiction work, and the 
court determines that the factual estoppel doctrine applies, the court should 
treat the plaintiff’s entire work as a factual work, limiting the protectable ele-
ments of the work to the expression or unique and original arrangement of the 
work. This significantly decreases the chances that a plaintiff will succeed in a 
copyright infringement claim unless the defendant wholesale appropriated the 
original expression or arrangement of fake facts. In order determine whether 
the factual estoppel doctrine should apply, the court should consider the follow-
ing three questions: (1) whether the author held out fake facts as fact; (2) 
whether the author intended for the public to rely on their work as fact; and (3) 
whether the public could believe that the work is factual. If the answer to all 
three of these questions is yes, then the factual estoppel doctrine should apply 
to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts under copyright law. 
A. The Author Held Out Fake Facts as Facts 
When a court is faced with an author attempting to assert copyright protec-
tion over fake facts, the first step should be to determine whether the author 
represented those fake facts as facts. This is an important inquiry that examines 
how an author held the work out to the public, including the author’s express 
representations, the style and source of the work, and whether or what types of 
disclaimers the author included with the work. If the weight of the evidence 
shows that the author held out fake facts as facts, then the author is more likely 
to be factually estopped from claiming the fake facts were fiction entitled to 
copyright protection. 
One factor to consider under this first question is whether the author made 
express representations that fake facts were facts or that their work was nonfic-
tion. These express representations could be within the work, on the work’s 
cover, in the preface or book jacket of the work, as the official library’s catego-
ry, or in the author’s statements. For instance, if the author claimed that the 
work was nonfiction, included statements in the preface or book jacket that the 
work is a true story or consisted of scientifically verifiable fact, allowed book 
reviews to claim that the work was nonfiction without issuing corrections, cate-
gorized the work as nonfiction in marketing and sale channels or with the Li-
brary of Congress, or made statements of the work’s truth in interviews or me-
dia appearances, then this first question most likely leans in favor of the fake 
facts having been held out as facts. 
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Another factor to consider under this first question is the work’s content, 
style, and source, and whether the work was written like nonfiction or pub-
lished in a source the public would rely on as factual. For instance, does the 
work read like nonfiction, is it published as a journalistic, news-like source, or 
in a source that the public would rely on to be factual? Even where authors do 
not expressly represent that their work is factual, if the work reads like nonfic-
tion and is included in a source that the public would generally assume to be 
factual—such as a dictionary, encyclopedia, map, or news section of the news-
paper—then this first question weighs toward finding that the author held out 
fake facts as facts. This factor alone cannot prove that the author represented 
the work as nonfiction because that could prevent highly creative and obviously 
fictional works, including news satire, found-footage films, and historic fiction, 
from copyright protection. However, it is one factor that courts should consider 
in conjunction with the author’s statements and explicit representations. 
Whether the work included a disclaimer also helps determine whether the 
fake facts were held out as facts. For instance, did the author include disclaim-
ers that the work was merely “inspired by a true story” or is “fiction”? These 
statements represent that the work is not entirely true, may include fictionalized 
elements, or is completely made-up. Similarly, in works where content and 
style are written like nonfiction, the inclusion of disclaimers such as the Boro-
witz Report’s “[n]ot the news,” or the common disclaimer in books that “this is 
a work of fiction. Any names or characters, businesses or places, events or in-
cidents, are entirely fictitious,” are also important considerations that the work 
was not held out as true. In fact, the existence of a clear disclaimer that the 
work is fiction within the work, such as being categorized as “fiction” in a 
book’s jacket, should outweigh any consideration of a work’s content or style. 
B. The Author Intended the Public to Rely on Fake Facts as Facts 
The second question that a court should ask is whether authors intended for 
the public to rely on their fake facts as facts. For instance, did the author intend 
to deceive or mislead the audience? Did they intend for their audience to rely 
upon their representations that their work was factual? Or was the author’s in-
tent merely to entertain and not for others to rely on the work as fact? Actual 
evidence of the author’s intent, the work’s genre, and the value consumers 
place on the author’s work can be objective evidence to support an author’s in-
tent to deceive. This question draws from a number of other areas of the law, 
including the classic equitable estoppel defense in copyright infringement 
claims in which courts require “the plaintiff must intend that its conduct shall 
be acted on or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so 
intended.”248 It also finds support in trademark law, which considers the de-
fendant’s intent to confuse consumers as one factor in a likelihood of confusion 
analysis; and in the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, which requires a show-
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ing that the actor “intends or has reason to expect [persons] to act or to refrain 
from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.”249 Requiring a showing of 
intent to deceive also helps address concerns that the factual estoppel doctrine 
will chill works in the found-footage, news satire, historic fiction genres, and 
concerns that courts might extend the factual estoppel doctrine to deem “a work 
‘factual’ regardless of the author’s intentions.”250 In the factual estoppel con-
text, the stronger the evidence that the author intended the public to rely on 
their work as factual, the more likely the factual estoppel doctrine should apply 
to exclude fake facts from copyright protection. 
Even though it can be difficult to find evidence of an author’s intent, there 
are certain factors that can help serve as objective evidence that the author in-
tended the public to rely on fake facts as facts. As a preliminary matter, the 
genre of the author’s work may help determine whether the author intended to 
deceive or mislead the public. Specifically, authors that include fake facts in 
certain genres—such as news, biographical or historical works, maps, encyclo-
pedias, telephone directories, dictionaries, religious or spiritual texts—are more 
likely to have the intent to deceive than authors that include fake facts in genres 
such as historical fiction, found-footage, or news satire. Therefore, courts may 
take into consideration the genre in which the fake facts appear in order to help 
discern the author’s intent. Authors hold out fake facts as facts for different rea-
sons. It is in society’s interest to deny copyright protection of fake fakes that 
are held out as true to deceive the public into relying on those fake facts. As 
explained above, fake facts that deceive are bad for society because they distort 
history, falsely shape our views of society, and provide misinformation for pos-
terity. On the other hand, it is in society’s interest to continue encouraging in-
novative and novel forms of literary or entertainment works that are not intend-
ed to deceive, but rather, are intended to entertain. Unlike fake facts that 
deceive, works that entertain—such as those in the historical fiction, found-
footage, satirical news genres—benefit society similarly to a good novel, 
blockbuster movie, or creative painting. Under this consideration, the work’s 
genre can help determine the author’s intention in holding out fake facts as true. 
Another factor to determine the author’s intent is whether audiences pri-
marily valued the author’s work because they believed it to be factual. The 
more evidence that the author’s work was valued because it was factual, the 
more likely the author intended for the public to rely on the fake facts as facts. 
This consideration draws from false advertising law where a defendant’s mis-
representation may be found to be material “in the sense that it would have 
some effect on consumers’ purchasing decisions.”251 Here, if consumers would 
only value the author’s work because it is nonfiction, then the author is more 
likely to have intended to deceive, and this second question would lean in favor 
of applying the factual estoppel doctrine to deny copyright. One commentator 
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acknowledged that application of the factual estoppel doctrine “makes sense 
because the real difference between factual and fictional material is not the ex-
tent to which it is true, but the reason the material is valued by consumers.”252 
Specifically, “material can be valued as factual, because it is considered cor-
rect, even if it is actually false. By the same token, material can be valued as 
fictional—for example, because it is entertaining—even if it turns out to be 
true.”253 Consumers value fact differently from fiction—they “value factual 
material as a guide for their action and in order to satisfy their curiosity about 
what the world is like. The reasons for their valuing fictional material are more 
aesthetic and recreational.”254 Found-footage films such as The Blair Witch 
Project, or news satire such as The Borowitz Report, are valued for their enter-
tainment quality. Encyclopedias or the news are valued because they purport to 
tell the truth. If an author’s work is primarily valued because it is purportedly 
true, then a court may find that the author is more likely to have intended to de-
ceive the public into relying on the work as fact. 
C. The Public Could Believe that the Work is Factual 
The final question that a court should ask is whether the public could be-
lieve the work is factual. Specifically, if more than a de minimis portion of the 
public255 could believe that the author’s work is factual, then the factual estop-
pel doctrine is more likely to apply. In order to answer this third question, a 
court should consider whether a defendant in a copyright infringement case was 
actually deceived into believing the work was true, whether the fake facts are 
so absurd that no reasonable person would be deceived, whether the work is 
one that most people would recognize as fiction, and whether the public was in 
fact deceived into believing that the work was nonfiction. This third question 
finds support in false advertising law, which requires a claimant to prove that a 
defendant’s representations of fact either deceived or had the potential to de-
ceive consumers.256 
One factor that could help answer this last question is whether the defend-
ant relied on the author’s representations that the work was factual. As dis-
cussed above, a handful of courts required a defendant to show actual reliance 
on the author’s representations that the work was true in order to apply the fac-
 
252  Green, supra note 80, at 945. 
253  Id. 
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but nonetheless significant number of readers will likely rely upon the author’s presentation 
of the work as factual, the social interest in allowing these readers to use these ‘facts’ with-
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256  Malla Pollack, Suing for False Advertising Under Federal Lanham Act, 111 AM. JUR. 
Trials 303 § 18 (2009) (“Proof that a significant number of potential customers were de-
ceived satisfies this element. However, likelihood of deception of a significant number of 
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tual estoppel doctrine.257 Reliance is a typical element required to assert a clas-
sic equitable estoppel defense both in copyright infringement cases and other 
areas of the law. For instance, in order to assert the defense of equitable estop-
pel to copyright infringement, “the defendant must be ignorant of the true facts 
. . . [and] must rely on the plaintiff’s conduct to its injury.”258 Similarly, to es-
tablish equitable estoppel in enforcing an oral contract for the sale of real prop-
erty, the parties must show that they acted to their detriment in reasonable reli-
ance on the other’s oral promise.259 However, for factual estoppel to apply, 
defendant’s reliance should be considered as only one piece of evidence to sup-
port the argument that the public could believe that the work is factual. It 
should not be considered a dispositive issue on its own. On the one hand, the 
factual estoppel doctrine should not apply just because the defendant confused 
fiction with fact. For instance, just because one congressman might have be-
lieved the Onion article that “Planned Parenthood Opens $8 Billion Abortion-
plex” is not enough to support a claim that the public could believe it to be 
true.260 Defendant’s own reliance, therefore, should only be one consideration. 
On the other hand, defendants should still be able to assert factual estoppel 
even if they cannot show that they relied on the author’s work as factual. If a 
defendant’s own reasonable reliance were a necessary element for factual es-
toppel, fake facts could technically regain their protection as fiction under cop-
yright law once they are debunked. For instance, now that Pizzagate has been 
debunked as fake, a movie producer who wants to use the plot to produce a fic-
tional comedy would not be able to show reasonable reliance and would need 
to seek permission to use the fake plot of that fake news article.261 By eliminat-
ing the strict requirement of reasonable reliance, authors are not able to benefit 
from their fake facts either now or in the future. 
Regardless, if defendants can show evidence that they reasonably relied on 
the work as factual, it could help prove that the public could believe the fake 
facts. For instance, the genre of the defendant’s secondary work—(i.e., whether 
the defendant’ work is fiction vs. nonfiction)—can serve as objective evidence 
that the defendant genuinely believed the author’s fake facts were facts. In De 
Acosta v. Brown, discussed above, the defendant incorporated the fake facts 
from the plaintiff’s screenplay about Clara Barton in a “nonfiction” biograph-
ical essay the defendant wrote and published.262 The fact that the defendant 
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used the screenplay as a source for her own nonfiction biography about Barton 
seemed to support that the defendant believed the plaintiff’s work to be a true 
account of Barton’s life. This could help demonstrate that more than a de min-
imis portion of the public could believe that the plaintiff’s screenplay was a 
true account of Barton’s life. 
Some authors have argued that a defendant who relied on the author’s work 
to produce a secondary work that is fiction rather than nonfiction should not be 
able to rely on the factual estoppel doctrine. For instance, in Mosley v. Follett, 
the plaintiff argued that that factual estoppel should not apply because the de-
fendant’s novel—which relied upon Mosley’s The Cat and the Mice—was fic-
tional and not a biographical or nonfiction work.263 As discussed above, if the 
defendant’s secondary work was nonfiction, that could potentially support that 
defendant believed the fake facts to be true, because the defendant incorporated 
them into their own nonfiction work. However, the opposite is not true. In other 
words, the fact that the defendant’s work was fiction instead of nonfiction 
should not weigh against factual estoppel. As described above, once a court de-
termines that the factual estoppel should apply to fake facts, those fake facts are 
treated as facts and offered the same limited copyright protection as facts. Any-
one can draw upon facts in order to create secondary works, including to create 
secondary factual works or fictional works. As the court in Mosley stated, 
“[t]he policy underlying the rule that history, like ideas, cannot be copyrighted 
applies even where the second work incorporates the factual material into a fic-
tional ‘thriller.’ ”264 Many popular historical fiction novels draw upon factual 
locations and historical events for dramatic background. Authors of fiction 
should be afforded the same opportunity as nonfiction authors to rely on the 
factual estoppel doctrine when sued for copyright infringement of fake facts. 
The incredibility of the fake facts also helps courts determine whether the 
public could believe the fake facts were facts. This inquiry is similar to the 
puffing defense in false advertising law, where grossly exaggerated advertising 
claims that no reasonable buyer would believe was true, or silly and unbelieva-
ble print and television advertising, are mere puffery not actionable under false 
advertising.265 In past factual estoppel case law, courts have considered whether 
fake facts are “so clearly incredible” that a defendant should be put on notice 
that the facts were fake.266 In other words, if the fake facts are so absurd and 
unbelievable that no reasonable person would believe them to be true, those 
courts indicated that the factual estoppel doctrine could not apply, and the fake 
facts would be protected by copyright as fiction.267 The absurdity of the fake 
facts should be one factor to help determine whether the public could believe 
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the work to be true, but should not completely negate application of the factual 
estoppel doctrine. Whether fake facts are unbelievable is such a subjective 
analysis that courts could find themselves in dangerous territory when they 
judge, for instance, whether statements of spiritual encounters, divine interven-
tions, creation stories, or other similar spiritual or religious facts are absurd or 
clearly incredible. That being said, the incredibility of the fake facts should be 
one factor to consider, especially when it is helpful to balance other evidence 
supporting the factual estoppel doctrine. For instance, the movie Return of the 
Living Dead featured the statement that “[t]he events portrayed in this film are 
all true. The names are real names of real people and real organizations.”268 
This statement could support a finding for factual estoppel under the first ques-
tion discussed above—that the author represented the work as factual. Never-
theless, the incredibility of the plot of the movie, the obviously fake events por-
trayed in the movie, and the fact that most people would recognize the horror 
film as being fiction, should help to balance out the weight of evidence support-
ing factual estoppel. Just as courts consider clearly over-the-top statements to 
be puffery in false advertising claims, so too should courts consider the incred-
ibility of the fake facts to determine whether the public could believe that the 
author’s work was factual. 
Finally, actual evidence of the public believing the work to be true would 
help demonstrate that the public could believe the work to be factual. This 
could be supported by actual evidence of public deception, such as book re-
views or commentary by third parties, or survey evidence of public deception. 
For instance, Oprah Winfrey’s public endorsement and later rebuke of Frey and 
his book A Million Little Pieces, explaining how Winfrey felt “duped” and how 
Frey “betrayed millions of readers,” could be used to support that the public 
could be deceived.269 Similar to proving the actual confusion factor in a likeli-
hood of confusion analysis in trademark infringement claims, actual confusion 
evidence or survey evidence is not required for a court to apply the factual es-
toppel doctrine to fake facts, but is helpful evidence to show that more than a 
de minimis portion of the public could believe the fake facts to be true. 
D. Balancing the Evidence Supporting Factual Estoppel 
In order to determine whether the factual estoppel doctrine should apply to 
treat fake facts as facts in a copyright infringement case, the court should bal-
ance and weigh the evidence supporting the three questions set forth above. For 
instance, if there is strong evidence showing that the author held out a work as 
being true, less evidence is needed to support that the author intended for the 
public to rely on the work as true or that the public could believe the work to be 
true. Similarly, if there is only slight evidence showing that the author held out 
the work as true, then there is a heavier burden to prove that the author intended 
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for the public to rely on the work as fact and that the public could believe the 
work was factual. This new test prevents authors from protecting fake facts in 
news articles, historical or biographical books, encyclopedias and other 
knowledge repositories, and religious or spiritual texts, but allows authors of 
fake facts in news satire, found-footage films, historical fiction, and other 
works to fictitiously claim to tell a true story for entertainment purposes to 
maintain their copyright protection. If the court finds that the weight of the evi-
dence supports that (1) the author held out fake facts as fact; (2) intending for 
the public to rely on the work as fact; and (3) the public could believe that the 
work is factual, the court should apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake 
facts as unprotectable facts under copyright law. Once a court applies factual 
estoppel in a copyright infringement claim, the court need only determine 
whether the author’s expression or arrangement of those facts were original 
enough to warrant copyright protection, and whether the defendant copied the 
author’s original arrangement or expression of their facts. Because copyright 
for compilations or expressions of facts is thin, this creates a much heavier bur-
den for an author to prove infringement. A defendant, however, can still be lia-
ble for copyright infringement of fake facts if that defendant wholesale appro-
priated the author’s work. 
CONCLUSION 
Fake facts can be damaging to society and the historical record, especially 
where they are held out as true by an author, with the intent that the public rely 
on them as facts, if more than a de minimis portion of the public could believe 
that they are true. While facts are not protected by copyright because they do 
not meet copyright’s originality standard, fake facts—which are created by an 
author and often original—technically do meet copyright’s originality standard. 
These fake facts, however, should not be protected by copyright law, and the 
public’s interest in efficiency, fairness, and promotion of socially valuable 
works justifies denying copyright protection to fake facts. The new factual es-
toppel doctrine framework proposed in this Article effectively and efficiently 
allows a court to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts under copyright where 
the author held out fake facts as facts, with the intent that the public rely on the 
fake facts as facts, and where the public could believe that the fake facts were 
true. Once a court finds factual estoppel, the author’s fake facts are treated like 
facts under copyright law, allowing later authors and the public to freely use 
those fake facts without incurring copyright liability. This result is not only fair, 
but also supports the policy and justifications for copyright law. 
